Public Bill Committee

[Mr. Joe Benton in the Chair]
E61- Equality and Diversity Forum (additional memorandum)

Clause 157

Exemption from taxi accessibility regulations

Vera Baird: I beg to move amendment 286, in clause 157, page 116, line 33, leave out Great Britain and insert England and Wales.

The effect of this amendment is to restrict the application of clause 157 to England and Wales.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 287 to 293

Vera Baird: The amendment relates to the application of the clause to Scotland. An error was made in the first place.

Amendment 286 agreed to.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Mark Harper: I will not trouble the Committee for too long. I just think that now is a useful opportunity to ask the Solicitor-General to look again at the provision before we return to it on Report. She will be aware that in February the Department for Transport published a consultation paper on improving access to taxis. I think that all the responses are back, but I have not seen any information from the Department. I think it is in order to discuss the matter because one option in the consultation document requires primary legislation. Given that we are transferring measures from the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 to the Bill, a change is needed in the provision on which the Government were consulting.
Will the hon. and learned Lady touch on where the consultation process has got to, describe the responses and say what the Department for Transport is likely to do? If primary legislation is the option favoured by the Government, the measure will need to be amended. A specific option is to allow local authorities to enforce section 36 of the DDA on taxis to ensure that the policy takes place in actuality rather than just in name.
Without veering too far from the Bill, it might be helpful to explain the changes. The Government have been consulting on how to improve access to licensed taxis and equality of opportunity for disabled people. A number of local authorities have implemented an accessible-taxi policy, but a lot have not and only about half the licensed taxis in the country can be described as wheelchair-accessible. I assume from the words can be described as wheelchair-accessible that that is being generous.
In one third of licensing authorities, less than 10 per cent. of taxis are wheelchair-accessible and 16 authorities have no wheelchair-accessible taxis. Just copying across the DDA regulations to the Bill means that that state of affairs will continue, which is not satisfactory.
The Government have been consulting on a policy to improve access to taxi fleets in line with the objectives under the clause to improve access to jobs and enable people to have better access to services and other social networks. That is squarely within the goods and services measures in the Bill and their attempt to improve accessibility for people. Recent court cases have highlighted or challenged local authority policies that require a proportion of taxi fleets to be wheelchair-accessible. The Government were looking at using regulation-making powers under the DDA to require local authorities to have an accessibility standard for a taxi fleet in their area and ensure compliance. One policy option is primary legislation that would require changes under the Bill. Another is the introduction of an accessible-taxi standard by 2025. The third option is the introduction of a standard in line with the existing enhanced standard by 2025, or application of an interim standard in urban areas and areas with high levels of illness by 2020.
Those options clearly have different costs. The first, unsurprisingly, would be the most expensive, with a value of around £2.7 million, although the benefits have not been calculated. The benefits would be significant and, I suspect, would outweigh the costs. It would be helpful if the Solicitor-General set out where the DFT has got to. If changes are needed in primary legislation, they are clearly not here now. If there are to be such legislative changes, perhaps she will say whether we are likely to have them on Report and when that is likely to be, because it might be a good opportunity to introduce the amendments.

Tim Boswell: As the Committee may knowmy hon. Friend doesI preceded him some time ago in holding Conservative Front-Bench responsibilities on disability. It is obviously an area of great importance in terms of services. The important thing is that there is adequate supply of vehicles to get people with disabilities to where they wish to go, which should be the main objective. I am not for a moment suggesting that that objective is not shared between usit is. However, there is a long history in a range of subjects, from the conduct of further education colleges, for which I had some responsibility at one stage, through accessible taxis to a variety of other cases on which the House legislates and local authorities do as little as possible until the last possible moment and are then forced and dragged into doing better. Intervening legislation since the DDA was designed to sharpen up their act, and I supported that.
At the same time, in the real world no one wants to create a situation in which we run out of taxis or wheelsputting it more bluntly and less technicallyto get people around. I realise that the Government have to balance that consideration. Will the Solicitor-General, in responding to my hon. Friends specific questions, also say more about her general take on how that is to be done? In particular, how does the hackney carriage licenceI confess not to be an expert on how that is normally expresseddiffer from the private hire licence? To what extent are private hire operators covered by other provisions in the Bill, and not, as it were, exempt? Will she explain how it should operate?

Mark Harper: My hon. Friend has highlighted an interesting issue about the difference between hackney carriages and taxis, which is what the regulations apply to, and private hire vehicles. The point of the clause is to allow for an exemption if the local authority thinks that, by insisting on some accessible taxis, all the taxis would flip over to being private hire vehicles. As well as thinking about what the consultation on improving access to taxis does, the Government ought to think about whether it makes sense for that regulation to apply for taxis but to have nothing similar for private hire vehicles. We could have all the taxis threatening to switch over to being private hire vehicles and the local authority saying, Fine, okay then, but we could then end up with no accessible taxis at all.
For disabled people, the important thing in the difference between taxis and private hire vehicles is that private hire vehicles have to be booked in advance. It would not be acceptable if disabled people were not able to get transport without having to plan ahead, just as everyone else can. If they could only book ahead, that would be a diminution of their freedom and ability to move. Will my hon. Friend comment on that?

Tim Boswell: My hon. Friend has read my mindthat was to be the second part of my remarks. It is an early hour of a Thursday morning, so I cannot resist the temptation, because it reflects a great human spirit, to quote a Labour Foreign Secretary of many years ago and of great repute, Ernie Bevin, who once defined his wish for free movement as wanting to be able to
go down to Victoria station... take a ticket and go where the hell I like.
That is exactly the point about taxis: people do not want to feel that because they have a disability they have to tie themselves down to pre-purchase. They should be able to use taxis.
I want to respond to my hon. Friends point so, in parenthesis, my experience doing the Front-Bench job, when I was bringing a large number of people with disabilities into the House, was somewhat mixed. There were occasionsI appreciate that the clause does not refer to the metropolitan areawhen we went to New Palace Yard and found some difficulty in getting the taxi to accommodate.
My first concern is a generic one about the extent to which the duties bite across the whole of the fleet, which may be available to disabled people, and how that will be balanced out. Secondly, I appreciate that we do not want to create another inspectorate at the centre, but I want from the Government a handle on the extent to which adequate provision is being made.
My third point concerns the criteria under which local authorities may bring this measure forward. As explained in the explanatory notes, it appears to be a fairly rigorous test: they would have to apply and make a case, which would have to be run past the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee. I hope that would happen and that it will be a rigorous test.
Clearly, one could refer to islands where it might be more difficult to provide such a service. However, the normal presumption should be that the taxis will be accessible and there should be as few exemptions as possible. If there are to be exemptions, they should be properly evidenced and explained, not just nodded through.
Clause 157 sets up the framework, but it is important that we have an understanding that it will not be a fiction and used as a whitewash whereby local authorities walk away from their duties or find ways to avoid them, and that it will not lead to a diminution of service across the piece for disabled people, which is a common concern of the Committee. I think that all that can be achieved, but I would like the Solicitor-Generals assurance that it will be.

Vera Baird: We decided last year to take a fresh look at how we can achieve our objective of enhancing accessible-taxi provision, and there was a consultation that closed on 24 April. We asked members of the public, groups and organisations whether the regulations were the right way to deal with the issue. We are still analysing all that. Many of the issues raised by hon. Gentlemen have absolute reality and I accept that completely. The possibility of people migrating to become private hire only is an issue that we must countenance. The possibility that there could be an area in which there were no accessible taxis because of the provision is something we need to look at.
There are protections within the four corners of clause 154, which deals with the issue properly, whereas clause 157 deals with exemptions. There has to be a consultationthe hon. Gentleman referred to the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee. The Secretary of State has to be satisfied that any exemption is appropriate, and he or she can put terms upon it. However, I readily accept that there is a need for us to come back and say to the House what we will do about the issue.

Tim Boswell: I appreciate that the Solicitor-General is in some difficulty because she does not speak for the Department for Transport, but will she ensure that it at least takes seriously the continuing monitoring of the situation, as well as setting up the framework on day one, which I am sure it will do plausibly and sensibly? However, it is delivery that will matter.

Vera Baird: Yes, I will, and we will have the responses to the consultation analysed by September. The Bill will be discussed on Report at the other end of recess, so we will have an opportunity to discuss this again. On that clear undertaking, for the time being I invite the hon. Member for Forest of Dean to allow the clause to stand part of the Bill.

Mark Harper: That is helpful, and I am grateful for confirmation of when the Solicitor-General expects the Bill to be considered on Report. We will look at the Department for Transport response to the consultation. I note that private hire vehicle drivers and operators were asked to respond to it. It will be interesting to see what they say, as well as what taxi operators say.
Given the Solicitor-Generals clear assurance, we will wait for the consultation and then discuss on Report what should be done.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 157, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 158 and 159 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 160

Lists of wheelchair-accessible vehicles

Amendments made: 287, in clause 160, page 118, line 32, after authority insert in England and Wales.

This amendment is consequent on amendment 288.
Amendment 288, in clause 160, page 118, line 35, leave out In this subsection and insert
(3A) A licensing authority in Scotland may include a vehicle on a list maintained under this section only if it is being used, or is to be used, by the holder of a special licence under that licence.
(3B) In subsections (3) and (3A).(The Solicitor-General.)

The effect of this amendment is to restrict the application of clauses 158 to 160, as regards Scotland, to vehicles used under special licences within the meaning of section 12 of the Transport Act 1985: that is, taxibuses and PHV-buses.

Clause 160, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 161 to 164 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 165

Appeals

Amendments made: 289, in clause 165, page 121, line 19, after authority insert in England and Wales.

The purpose of this amendment, together with amendments 290 and 291, is to make separate provision regarding appeals in Scotland.
Amendment 290, in clause 165, page 121, line 21, leave out or, in Scotland, the sheriff.

See Members explanatory statement for amendment 289.
Amendment 291, in clause 165, page 121, line 22, at end insert
(1A) A person who is aggrieved by the refusal of a licensing authority in Scotland to issue an exemption certificate under section 159 may appeal to the sheriff before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the refusal..

See Members explanatory statement for amendment 289.
Amendment 292, in clause 165, page 121, line 23, after subsection (1) insert or (1A).(The Solicitor-General.)

This amendment is consequent on amendment 291.

Clause 165, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 166

Interpretation

Amendment made: 293, in clause 166, page 122, line 16, leave out except in sections 161 to 164 and insert
in sections 155 and 158 to 160.(The Solicitor-General.)

This amendment prevents clauses 154 and 156 from applying as regards taxis in Scotland; in relation to clause 157, the amendment is consequent on amendment 286.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Tim Boswell: I think that it would bore the Committee to tears to go into the detail of an interpretation clause. However, I would like the Solicitor-Generals assurance that the list of categories of assistance dog is sufficiently comprehensive. It begins with specific types and goes on to mention prescribed charities. I think that that will cover all types.
I have a constituency interest because a marvellous charity called Dogs for the Disabled, which does excellent work, is located at the edge of my constituency, near to Banbury in the neighbouring constituency. That charity provides dogs for people with wider disabilities than the conventional disabilities of deafness or blindness. Will the Solicitor-General assure me that she will nudge her colleagues in the relevant Department to ensure that the definition is sufficiently comprehensive, as I believe it is, so that any dog that is trained to help a person will be admitted?

Vera Baird: The category of assistance dog is widening all the time. The hon. Gentleman has put his finger on an important point, but the clause allows the Secretary of State to provide for further categories of assistance dog as it becomes necessary.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 166, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 167 to 174 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 175

Rail vehicle accessibility regulations

Vera Baird: I beg to move amendment 87, in clause 175, page 127, line 38, leave out 194(3)(a) and insert 194(4)(a).

This amendment would correct a cross-reference. The correct reference is to the power of the Secretary of State to make different provision in regulations for different purposes. The incorrect reference relates to sex discrimination in schools.
This is to change 194(3)(a) to 194(4)(a), which, I am afraid, was a drafting error.

Amendment 87 agreed to.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Mark Harper: This, I hope, will not take too long. Again, it relates to our friends in the Department for Transport. Given what the Solicitor-General said about timing, the issue may well fall within that category as well. In April, the Department for Transport issued a consultation on rail services for disabled people under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Specifically, the consultation is about improving the accessibility of light rail vehiclesthose used on metro, underground and tram systems and other prescribed modes of guided transport.
I ask about the matter again to see how it interacts with what is being proposed in the regulations under the clause. The Government are carrying out their consultation. There are European standards on heavy rail vehicleswhat we commonly call trainsand the appropriate stations. To ensure that the new regulations do not impose a double regulatory burden, the Government are consulting on light rail vehicles and are also considering two draft regulations. I am sure that the Solicitor-General is not terribly familiar with them, because they are a bit convoluted. The Rail Vehicle Accessibility (Non-Interoperable Rail System) Regulations 2009 is not the most catchy and snappy of titles.
The regulations are quite technical. Ministers occasionally bring out rail vehicle accessibility regulations, both general and specific, and, anorak that I am, I faithfully get them from the Vote Office and read them to ensure that they are in order. Although they always have been, it is worth checking such things.
I want to check that the provisions that the Government mention here, which are to continue to have the right technical specifications in place but to have a less onerous regulatory system, are to be introduced on or before 31 December. Will the Solicitor-General update the Committee on how the consultation is proceeding? Moreover, will she tell us whether the proposed changes are purely regulatory and whether the way the DDA has been transferred into the Bill will have any impact on them? Will anything need to be done on Report or can these regulations be added to the existing powers and then transferred across into the Bill?

Tim Boswell: Briefly, and rather in the spirit of my earlier intervention, I would like the Solicitor-General to have a word with her hon. Friends about the implications in practice. This is about rail accessibility, which will vary depending on whether the train is travelling or coming to rest at a station.
Let me sketch out a particular dilemma. As we improve the provision for disabled people on rail, which we should, there is bound to be pressure on space for fully abled passengers. It requires a sensitive design to make the spaces as flexible as possible to accommodate the needs of disabled persons with wheelchairs or for other passengers if that is appropriate.
One of the by-products of that is that if capacity is cut in the carriage by making provision for wheelchair access, another carriage might be needed in order to carry the same number of passengers or to meet the same demand. I promise that I will not go into a debate about the economics of the rail system, because that would take us into very unsatisfactory territory. Another carriage would be fine, although not without cost.
A concomitant effect at very small stationsI have two in my constituencywith short platforms is that if the configuration increases from six cars to seven, some may overshoot the platform. That may not be a problem for people who are fully abled and agile, but it would be more of a difficulty for wheelchair users or those who are not nimble in getting off trains, such as older people, because they may find themselves in the wrong place on the train. I suspect that many of us have had that experience on a crowded tube trainone suddenly finds that the door at the end of the carriage will not open and one has quickly to shimmy down to the next door, which is not always easy.
All I am suggestingI am not proposing that this should be tied down in lawis that merely saying that carriages should be wheelchair accessible is not quite the same as saying that wheelchair users should be able to access the whole length of the train for safe egress and ingress to the platform. A little conversation, at least, with the Solicitor-Generals sister Department might be useful, because it is important in the general framework of what I know is intended to be an enabling and encouraging clause to get it as practically right as possible.
For example, when the accessibility issue is being cleared in relation to new rolling stock and if there are limited-access stations, which are better than closed stationswe had the same dilemma about hackney cab servicesit may be sensible if they have to produce an operational plan to ensure that wheelchair users are notified, put in a suitable part of the train, escorted, provided with more time or whatever is appropriate. Those are largely operational matters for the Solicitor-Generals sister Department, and I leave those thoughts with her.

Vera Baird: The hon. Gentleman is right: it is hard to legislate for the practical problems he foresees. In the example he sketched out, I suppose that the train would have to move up a little. We hope that in the longer term the legislation will change attitudes and make people more aware of the need always to think about the possibility of disabled people being present. He makes a valid point, as ever. He is a devoted supporter of disabled people and I praise him, not for the first time, for that commitment.
The clause deals with the fairly technical rail vehicle accessibility regulations, and I am not such an anorak as the hon. Member for Forest of Dean that I check whether they are in order, so I must take that on trust. We are consulting, as he said, and that consultation closes on Friday, so if the hon. Member for Daventry or anyone else wants to add anything, time is short.
The clause replicates in the Bill the provisions of section 46 of the DDA, and any new regulations that emerge from the consultation will be enacted under this provision. We do not believe that anything more will be needed on Report. Having probed the issue, and with the assurance that a couple of days remain to contribute to the consultation, I hope that the hon. Member for Forest of Dean is content to allow the clause to stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 175, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 176

Exemptions from rail vehicle accessibility regulations

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mark Harper: I have a brief question arising from our previous debate. If the Secretary of State is asked to make provision for an exemption order, after consulting the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee and any other person whom he thinks appropriate, he has the options of making an exemption order, refusing to do so, or doing so with specific conditions and restrictions. In the past, would those conditions have included the sort of communication that the operator had to undertake to make people aware of particular rail networks or trains that were not accessible?
A criticism that is often raised with me by constituents is that they are not only annoyed when a particular rail network is not accessible; they are most annoyed when they do not know that it is accessible or they think, or are led to believe, that it is accessible. In such circumstances they may be surprised and may end up with a lot of problems once they are on the train, including finding that they have to go to another station that they did not expect to go to. If the Secretary of State is to make exemption orders and rail vehicles are not accessible, one useful condition could be included relating to what the operator has to do in terms of proper communication, so that disabled people using that service are aware not just that it is not accessible, but what other options are available that they might use to maximise their mobility.

Tim Boswell: My hon. Friends comments on the clause have helped to satisfy me in relation to my previous point. It is terribly clear that we should not simply stamp that provision on the physical spec of the rolling stock; we should look at how the process will work in practice. We are establishing some understanding about that and, I hope, encouraging the Ministers departmental colleagues.
I should like to return to a point that was in my mind when we were talking earlier about Hackney carriages: the basis on which orders can be made on exemptions or derogations from regulations. I remember, as a Minister, facing the dilemma of the extent to which a Secretary of State would specify the grounds for their decision to confirm, modify or refuse an exemption order. I suspect that disabled people and their organisations would want to build up a corpus of views about whether that was done reasonably and not simply as an economic cop-out. It would be interesting to know whether there will be something beyond the bald rubric that the Minister has decided on, so that people could begin to understand the rationale for a growingone hopes it is not too fast growingcorpus of decisions for exemptions.

Vera Baird: My answer to the hon. Gentleman is that I do not know whether the rationale will be put into communications following the granting of an exemption or the imposition of a condition, although it obviously should, for the reason that he mentioned. I am glad that such important practical points are being raised. Exemptions to such provisions that have been made under the DDA are usually time-limited, so it is usually about getting things in order in due course. I understand that conditions are often set on those provisions, and that would remain the case for exemptions granted under the Bill.
Committee members have made some practical points. Apparently, the extent of the availability of conditions to the Secretary of State would permit the kind of communication that the hon. Member for Forest of Dean mentioned. Such practical matters will be drawn to the attention of the appropriate Departments so that all the sensible points that have been mentioned are taken into account when exemptions are granted.
A limited range of events would cause exemption. For example, the Glasgow underground has different dimensions from other underground train services and it would be difficult for it to meet the precise regulations in relation to wheelchair accommodation, so it has an exemption for the time being, but such a provision is made available and used only in pretty exceptional situations like that, where bigger tunnels would have to be dug under the whole of Glasgow.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 176 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 177 to 179 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 20 agreed to.

Clauses 180 to 182 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 21 agreed to.

Clauses 183 and 184 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 22

Statutory provisions

Amendment proposed: 88, in schedule 22, page 233, line 42, at end insert
( ) a college of further education within the meaning of section 36 of the Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 1992;
( ) a university in Scotland;.(The Solicitor-General.)

This amendment would ensure that the exception to Part 5 in paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 22 will apply to institutions providing further and higher education in Scotland and that an order may be made under paragraph 3(5) in respect of such institutions.

Evan Harris: I would be grateful if the Solicitor-General gave a further explanation of the implications of the amendment. It might be obvious, but given that we will be debating another part of the schedule, it would be useful.

Vera Baird: We missed out a bit about further education and higher education provision in Scotland, by failing to make reference to the appropriate statute. We have added that.

Amendment 88 agreed to.

Evan Harris: I beg to move amendment 255, in schedule 22, page 234, line 4, leave out sub-sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 256, in schedule 22, page 234, line 10, at end insert except in relation to academy schools.
Amendment 257, in schedule 27, page 247, line 18, at end insert
School Standards and Framework Act 1998
Section 58(6) and (7). Section 60(4) and (5)..

These sections of the School Standards and Frameworks Act relate to paragraph 4 of Schedule 22.

Evan Harris: The amendments are all of a type. Amendment 257 is consequential to amendment 255, and amendment 256 is also consequential to make it clear that all maintained schools, including academy schools, should be dealt with in this way. The amendments seek to probe the Governments understanding of the extent to which sections 58 to 60 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 comply with article 4(2) of the relevant Council framework directive, are an interpretation of it, or were designed to go further than it in some way. They seek clarification that article 4(2) is not the ultimate restriction on the extent of the powers available to schools, particularly faith schools, under those sections.
We are dealing with the potential for conflict between the rights secured under the directivewhich I believe the Government must have regard toand either what is available to schools under sections 58 to 60 of the School Standards and Framework Act, or what schools believe is available to them, which might go beyond what is actually available. I understand that there has been some correspondence.

Vera Baird: I am slightly troubled that the hon. Gentleman raises in this debate the question of compliance regarding a provision in the School Standards and Framework Act that has absolutely no connection with the Bill. Whatever the compliance of that Act with the directive, it will not be changed by this Bill. Where is the relevance?

Evan Harris: I will go on to explain the relevance, but to briefly answer that question, in the Bill we are dealing with the rights of people to not be discriminated against on one of the protected grounds. Section 60 of the School Standards and Framework Act arguably gives state schools the right to dismiss someone on the basis of their belief, their attendance at worship or their conduct. It is alleged by faith schools that conduct that is not consistent with those tenets, including private conduct related to sexual orientation, comes within sections 58 to 60. The Solicitor-General will know that when hon. Members debated the 2003 employment regulations, which are reproduced in the Bill, there was a long debate about the paragraph in those regulations that said that, notwithstanding the regulations, sections 58 to 60 of the Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998 will apply. Therefore, this is very much a live issue; that is what the provisions say. I shall explain what I mean.
It is important to look at article 4(2) of the Council framework directive, because everything depends on whether it is legitimate for the schedule to say that sections 58 to 60 are acceptable and can stand even though the Bill is supposed to implement the directive. It is important to see what article 4(2) says, because it is critical to this debate. It states:
Member States may maintain national legislation in force at the date of adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating national practices existing at the date of adoption of this Directive pursuant to which, in the case of occupational activities within churches and other public or private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a difference of treatment based on a persons religion or belief shall not constitute discrimination where,
and it goes on to explain where.
I will accept that voluntary aided schools certainly are
public or private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief,
and I will accept that the religious discrimination that is permitted in those schools predated, by statute of 1998, the adoption of the directive, and that there were practices around at that time that predated it. Therefore, it is the relevant exemption, and I do not think that there should be any difference between us.
However, article 4(2) goes on to explain the basis of the conditions that must be met in order for sections 58 to 60 to be complied with. It states:
where, by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a persons religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organisations ethos. This difference of treatment shall be implemented taking account of Member States constitutional provisions and principles.
The article then goes on to say, in a second paragraph:
Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this Directive shall thus
I draw attention to the word thus, which refers to the conditions laid down in the previous paragraph
not prejudice the right of churches and other public or private organisations, the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, acting in conformity with national constitutions and laws, to require individuals working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisations ethos.
My first question to the Solicitor-GeneralI would be grateful if she could answer thisis whether she believes that article 4(2) contains two separate exemptions: one that relates to a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, and a second one in the second paragraph that does not require that, despite the thus that says that the directive shall not
prejudice the right of churches and other public or private organisations, the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, acting in conformity with national constitutions and laws, to require individuals working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisations ethos.
I accept that any employer can have that as a term of employment. The question is, where that would involve discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief or, indeed, conduct related to sexual orientation, whether an exemption is provided for such a contract to be lawful when it otherwise would not be. Is it the Governments opinion that those are separate, or is it one? If they accept, as I believe they do, that it is one, it does not mean that I am right and the Government are wrong, but it would be helpful in framing our discussion.
I would also be grateful if the Solicitor-General confirmed that article 4(2) is there only to
maintain national legislation in force at the date of adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating national practices existing at the date of adoption of this Directive.
In other words, brand new practice cannot rely on the dispensation.
My third question is whether ethos alone can constitute the genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement. Will the Minister comment on the words,
by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a persons religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organisations ethos?
In other words, couldif all other requirements are metan employer with such an ethos say, You are not in compliance with our ethos ab initio, regardless of the work that you do? I have asked that question previously in discussions on the Bill.
The matter is important because I accept that there will be cases where someones job requires them to do something that they cannot do. If the organisation has an ethos and meeting those needs is an occupational requirement, that will fall within the exemption. I accept that, but I would like the Minister to clarify whether compliance with an ethos alone is sufficient, or whether some impact on the way in which the person carries out the job should also be part of the case. In addition, is it the case that that cannot just be assumed and that it has to be shown to be part of the case?
My fourth question is about what is meant in the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 by the reference to ethos. I am not an expert on thisperhaps the hon. Member for Glasgow, East isbut a religious schools ethos might be that they want to encourage children to be brought up and learn in a Christian environment with regard to Christian standards of conduct. Such an ethos might relate to the way that a Christian society operates vis-Ă -vis charity to all and respect for everyone. I believe that that is separate from a school ethos that is based on the virgin birth, the resurrection and certain other tenetsin other words, the ethos of a school is not necessarily the same as the doctrine of the religion.
If I am rightand I believe that I amis it the duty of the teacher to have regard to the ethos of the school or to have regard to the tenets of the religion? The tenets of some religions state that homosexuality is a sin. I do not expect that the ethos of a school would contain that. If the exemption is to essentially punish people in employment terms by preference or dismissal on the basis of their allegiance to the ethos, are we talking about the ethos of the school or the tenets of the religious organisation?

John Mason: I stand to be corrected by those who understand our dictionaries better than meperhaps the Minister can help on this matterbut my understanding of ethos in, for example, a Catholic school is that it relates to the whole teaching of the Catholic Church, which would include things such as the virgin birth and so on. I would have thought that in a Muslim school, similarly, that would include the whole teaching, including the Prophet and so on.

Evan Harris: That is the question I am asking. I am interested in the hon. Gentlemans view, and I am even more interested in the Governments view. I am not keen to get into the issue of dictionaries at all.
I have raised the issue because section 60 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 does not talk about the ethos of the school. I shall set out section 60(5), because it is important to the point I am making and to a point that I am going to make:
If the school is a voluntary aided school
(a) preference may be given, in connection with the appointment, remuneration or promotion of teachers at the school, to persons
(i) whose religious opinions are in accordance with the tenets of the religion or religious denomination specified in relation to the school under section 69(4).
My question is whether that relates to the ethos of the school or the tenets of the religion. I think that the hon. Gentleman would have to say that the tenets of some religions are that homosexuality is objectively disordered and a sin, and that practising homosexuals will, unless they repent, be punished in the after-life in some way. That is separate from what we would expect to see in the ethos of a school. I think even those who strongly support faith schools do not expect pupils and teachers to sign up to homophobia in the ethos, even if that is for historical and doctrinal reasons.

John Mason: I find that difficult to distinguish. Let us take a faiththe one that I am familiar with in Glasgow would be Catholic schools, which are the main type of faith school. The people would look on it as the whole teaching of their religion. For example, I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is familiar with something like the ten commandments, which is a whole package. To start taking one part of the package and not other parts, and to say that some part is ethos and some part is something else strikes me as a bit artificial.

Evan Harris: I am aware of the hon. Gentlemans view. I am raising the question because I believe that there are many people who run faith schools who believe that the ethos equals all the tenets of the faith, including ones that I know are held sincerely and are not designed to create a humiliating or degrading atmosphere. But if someones parents are gay, and they are told in the ethos of the school that that is sinful, objectively wrong, and that they will be punished in the after-life, that raises an issuethe hon. Gentleman must accept that that is the case. I am interested in the Governments view. Is the ethos to which teachers must have regard under section 60 the tenets of the religion, or are the two different? Are they required to be different in order to avoid some of the problems that I have identified, such as the ones related to homosexuality?

Mark Harper: I return to the hon. Gentlemans specific example. Fortunately, the Committee will be pleased to know that I am not going to get into debating the virgin birth and any other biblical matters.

Vera Baird: Or the resurrection.

Mark Harper: As the Minister said, certainly not the resurrection. Let us take the hon. Gentlemans specific example where two parents are gaypresumably they have adopted a child. If that child went to a school where they were taught that homosexuality is sinful, it would be difficult for the child. Why on earth would parents in that position have chosen to send their child to a faith school where that was the belief of that religion? That would be completely crackers. Why would parents do that? With his example, given that the point of legislation is to deal with real harmI am thinking back to the evidence that we had from Ben Summerskill from Stonewallit cannot be drawn into the matter. I do not think it is realistic.

Joe Benton: Order. There is no objection to hon. Members making comparisons, but the debate has gone a little wide of the margin, to be quite honest. Please come back to the amendment.

Evan Harris: Gay people can be Catholic. There may only be one primary school in their villagethere are all sorts of reasons why the example might occur. Teachers may want to teach in a school where they live; should they have to go elsewhere? To that extent, I believe that the intervention by the hon. Member for Forest of Dean was in order, as I think there is a real problemit has an impact on the choices made. Why should someone have to choose to do something they would not otherwise do for fear of something happening like the example I have described?
I think it is perfectly legitimate for a Catholic school to teach children that Catholics believe that practising homosexuality is sinfulI have no problem with that. The school should teach that in those termsnot it is, but Catholics believe that it is. That is information and knowledge, but that is different from having it in the ethos.
I will return to what I was saying. My question was whether there is a distinction between a school ethos in practice and tenets of religion. The second part of the provision, section 60, states that
preference may be given...to persons
in terms of teachers
who attend religious worship in accordance with those tenets.
I am interested to know whether the Government believe that that simply means attendance at, or whether it means participation. Does attendance imply joining in the prayers, or does it simply mean a need to turn up and essentially not be disruptive? If it is merely a question of attendance and does not require participation, that would be less objectionable. It is important that we understand on what basis the Government intend to allow people to be discriminated against. That was my fifth question.
My sixth question relates to section 60(5)(a)(iii) of the 1998 Act, which states that preference can be given to people
who give, or are willing to give, religious education at the school in accordance with those tenets.
Does the Minister think that only practising and believing Catholics can teach religious education in a Catholic school? Is such religious education so doctrinal and instructional that it would be difficult for someone who is not a Catholic to teach it? I accept that it would be difficult for such people to teach pupils with sincerity that certain things are wrong, that certain things happened and what they should believe. People who are not Catholic can be competent. For example, some professors of theology at Oxford are Catholic and are canons of Christchurch cathedral. However, they teach Anglican theology at professorial level in higher education. Is religious education in voluntary-aided schools so instructional that it cannot be taught successfully by people who are not sincere believers in the faith, even though they may know the curriculum and be good teachers?
Finally, section 60(5)(b) of the 1998 Act states that
regard may be had, in connection with the termination of the employment
sacking
of any teacher at the school, to any conduct on his part which is incompatible with the precepts, or with the upholding of the tenets, of the religion or religious denomination so specified.
First, is that supposed to mean conduct that is incompatible with the stated ethos of the school or can it mean conduct that is incompatible with the tenets of the religion? That is a key question if we are to understand the scope of that exemption under the 1998 Act and whether it is compatible with the Bill.
Secondly, can such conduct include private sexual conduct stemming from sexual orientation? I seek the Ministers reassurance that she will be consistent with her earlier support for Justice Richardss clear statement in the Amicus judgment, which he stated twice, that it is impossible to separate discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation from discrimination on the grounds of conduct that stems directly from that sexual orientation under the directive. That statement stands because the judgment has not been overturned on appeal. It is therefore not possible for schools to say that they are not discriminating against somebody on the basis that they are gay, but because they are in a civil partnership, are living with someone of the same gender or are felt to be having lawful sexual relations with someone of the same gender. Justice Richardss judgment did not even get into whether such discrimination would be permitted under the rights of privacy and non-discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1998 because it relied on the directive.
Hon. Members may correct me if I am wrong, but I believe it is the assumption of many schools that they will be entitled to consider sex outside marriagewhich is the only kind of sex a gay person can have in this countryas conduct that is
incompatible with the precepts, or with the upholding of the tenets, of the religion or religious denomination so specified.
My view is that paragraph 2 of article 4 of the directive requires a justified and legitimate occupational requirement that relates to the job, not a free-standing requirement that relates to the beliefs of the employer. Does the Minister think that a school can sack somebody, or not prefer them in some way, on the basis of their private conduct outside the school?
Schools ask how someone can deliver religious education according to the tenets of a religion that talks about sex within faithful marriage when that persons private life is not consistent with that. One can see where schools are coming from, but the Minister has said previously, I believe, that discrimination based essentially on sexual orientation is discrimination based on sexual orientation. Even if the discriminators intention is that the discrimination should be based on religious belief because the persons conduct is not consistent with the religious beliefs required, it is still discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. My final question, therefore, is whether she agrees that that is the case.
I hope that I have been able to explain why it is important, given the number of teachers who fall subject to sections 60 and 58 of the School Standards and Framework Act, that we do not require teachers to claim unfair dismissal in relation to their private lives when that would be a burden on them. We should not expect teachers to live in fear of being discovered to be gay by schools or to have difficulties finding employment in areas where most schools are faith schools. When we pass such legislation, we therefore need to be clear about its boundaries. In introducing the amendments, I look to the Minister to give us some reassurance on the issue. I am grateful for the patience of the Committee.

Vera Baird: The UK negotiated the inclusion of article 4(2) of the framework directive with the intention of preserving the provisions in the School Standards and Framework Act, and we are satisfied that they are compliant. That provides for future legislation to allow differential treatment on religious grounds, where that reflects national practices and where there is a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement. Nothing in the Act can be used to discriminate against someone because of their sexual orientation, which would be unlawful in employment law.
Let me addthis is all that I intend to addthat we do not intend to override substantive education legislation in the Bill. There is no problem whatever, and we will not mend something that is not broken.

Evan Harris: It is extremely disappointing that the Minister will not engage with eight straightforward questions that are within the scope of the Bill. If they were out of order, I would have been called out of order by you, Mr. Benton. What we have is a Committee in which the Minister simply will not answer questions that have been legitimately raised. It is the Committees job properly to scrutinise the implications of employment discrimination legislation, which affect hundreds or thousands of people, but she has said practically nothing. I look to you for advice on what we can do raise questions that are in order and to have them answered.

Joe Benton: Let us get one thing absolutely straight. If the hon. Gentleman had been out of order, I would have ruled him out of order. I have to ask at this point whether the Minister has replied.

Vera Baird: Yes.

Joe Benton: The Minister has replied. It is not my position to give advice on the matter. It is up to the hon. Gentleman what he wants to do. He has the choice of withdrawing the amendment or pressing it to a vote. I invite him to comment on that.

Evan Harris: I am still extremely surprised by the Ministers unwillingness to answer questions that are in order as part of the scrutiny of the Bill in Committee. The amendments have been on the amendment paper

Joe Benton: Order. I am sorry, but we cannot pursue that. The Minister has indicated that she has replied. As far as I am concerned, that is her response. It is now up to the hon. Gentleman to press the amendment or withdraw it.

Evan Harris: I am responding to what the Minister didor did notsay. It is difficult to know what to do at this point. Normally, one has a debate, and ones questions are at least addressed and preferably answered. That enables one to determine[Interruption.] I am not asking a question. I am just reflecting on the response.

Joe Benton: Order. I am sorry to do this, but my ruling is quite clear. I advise the hon. Gentleman to press his amendment or withdraw it. What he is doing now is pursuing what he interprets to be a lack of response from the Minister. The Minister has indicated clearly that she has responded as far as she is going to. Frankly, this is becoming a little bit negative in terms of Committee procedure and the sake of good order. I advise the hon. Gentleman either to press his amendment or withdraw.

Evan Harris: Given that we have not been able to have a debate or proper scrutiny, I do not see how I can press the amendment, because Committee members will not know on what terms they are voting. On that basis alone, in bitter disappointment at the Governments failure to respond, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Joe Benton: Is it the Committees wish that the amendment be withdrawn? [Interruption.] I ask again. Is it the Committees wish that the amendment be withdrawn?

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 22 agreed to.

Clause 185 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 186

Charities

Evan Harris: I beg to move amendment 252, in clause 186, page 133, line 24, leave out subsections (5) and (6).
An amendment to protect an individual from discrimination from a charity because of their atheism.
This is a probing amendment to ask whether it is justified to have an exemption in respect of the Scout Association, as that is what the clause relates to. The Scout Association is an excellent organisation that does brilliant work. It is, in many cases, supported by public authorities and given accommodation by schools and public authorities. Many young people want to join if they can because their friends belong, and it is often the only or the main extracurricular activity in the community.
A provision was written into the Equality Act 2006 saying that although charities could not discriminate against people on the basis of their religion unless it was written into their charitable instrument and otherwise justified, organisations that had had such requirements, now considered inappropriate, before 18 May 2005 would be allowed to continue to do so. The impact is that children who cannot sincerely say that they believe in God cannot join the Scouts and people who wish to help promote or work within the Scouts as scout leadersthe enormous bulk of whom are not religious, as the Scouts are not a religious organisation; they just have a joining oathare not allowed to do so. Many scout groups are short of leaders, so what they do when a qualified person in the community wants to work with young people is to say, Well, just cross your fingers when you say the oath.

Tim Boswell: I rise simply to seek elucidation. Did I hear the hon. Gentleman aright when he said that he thought the amendment extended only to the Scoutsin other words, that no other bodies have pre-existing vested rights, whether they are atheistic and exclude believers or nominally include believers? I think that he is nodding on that point. Secondly, if he considers that the Scout Association is indeed the only organisation affectedthis is, perhaps, an indirect question to the Ministerwill issues of hybridity arise?

Evan Harris: I cannot answer the hon. Gentlemans last point, because I have limited knowledge, and people might say that my knowledge, even in those limited areas, is limited and it does not extend to issues of hybrid Bills and so on.
I do not know of any organisation that is not otherwise covered by the exemption that is allowed for charities with a religious object, but which has a joining oath that is not otherwise pursued, as is so in respect of scouting activities. It is well known that the Scouts are anxious not to exclude people, but it is sad that their solution is to ask people to be insincere when signing up to the oath. I am not saying that that is the Scouts official policy and I am not saying that I approve or disapprove of that.

David Drew: Can the hon. Gentleman give me one example of the Scouts actually saying that in writing, as a definitive statement?

Evan Harris: I can give the hon. Gentleman that. I will send him examples of people who have written to me, and examples from other organisations, complaining that they were not allowed to join unless they took this oath and saying that they were toldI do not see why they should lie because they want to join the Scoutsthat the solution would be to make the statement insincerely. I can understand that, because the Scouts do not want to lose people from the community who happen not to be of the same religion or are not God-fearing, as it were. So there is an unfortunate situation, although the Scouts would be none the worse if they dropped the oath, which discriminates against both children and leaders. Continuing with the oath deprives people of access to scouting activities and deprives the Scouts of people who would be good leaders working in that organisation as volunteers.

Diane Abbott: The hon. Gentleman will wish to know that there is an excellent alternative to the Scouts that was set up precisely because of this sort of God-fearing and monarchy-fearing nonsensethe Woodcraft Folk.

Evan Harris: I am not here to big-up the Woodcraft Folk or to big-down the Scouts. People will make their own decisions. However, in many communities the Scouts is the only game in town and therefore there is no choice. I do not think that such organisations, which are not religious, should have religious tests or not-religious tests. I am grateful for Committee members advice. Everyone reading these proceedings will now be encouraged to go down that path. I want to stress that I am not hostile to the Scoutsthey do a great jobbut they would be aided in their work if they were not allowed certain

Mark Harper: I am sympathetic to what the hon. Member for Stroud said. There is an active scout movement, and a guide movement, in my constituency. Those youth organisations are popular but they are not the only ones. Young people can join an extraordinary range of organisations. The problem is usually not a shortage of young people, but of adults willing to put the time in to run them.
The hon. Gentleman is in danger of creating non-real examples. In my time as a Member of Parliament, I have never had a single complaint from anybody who has been turned away from the Scouts or told that they have to fib about whether they believe in God. The hon. Gentleman is creating fictional problems that do not exist in the real world and is asking us to deal with them. That is unnecessary. Having started with a paean to how great the Scouts were, he spent the next five minutes saying what a dreadful organisation it is and what a dreadful way they go about doing things, including telling people to be hypocrites before they are able to join. That is not my experience of the Scout Association as it operates in my constituency and, looking around at Committee members, it does not seem that they have experienced that either.

Evan Harris: There is a real world outside the hon. Gentlemans constituency surgery and his own experiences, just as I accept that there is a real world outside my direct experience. I will send him the examples that I have received, as well as sending them to the hon. Member for Stroud.

David Drew: Send them to all members.

Evan Harris: I will send them to all Committee members, then the hon. Member for Forest of Dean will see that he is wrong in saying that the problem does not exist. It is no surprise that people who are concerned about this matter might not feel willing to come to him if he is not sympathetic to them. However, that is their choice and his choice. At no point did I say that the Scout Association was a dreadful organisation. As the hon. Gentleman reports, some scout groups are short of leaders and one reason for that is their unnecessary religious test. In many places, Scouts are the only or main youth activity. Not every constituency is blessed with the youth organisations that the hon. Member for Forest of Dean talks about in his constituency. Where we have non-religious youth organisations, they should be inclusive, and that is all that I am asking for.

John Howell: I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman, like me and my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry, went to Thame in my constituency to see all the Oxfordshire scouts gathered together. An enormous number of scouts spent an entire weekend there. The message that came across was that they had huge numbers of people waiting to join. Many parents, who volunteer on a regular basis, were also there. There was no shortage of volunteers and no overt religion. All I saw was scouts having an extremely good time in very good weather and really living up to the expectations that we would have insisted that young people have these days.

Evan Harris: I am sure that it was a jolly weekend. I have been to scout jamborees in my own constituency, and the hon. Gentleman is right; they are not an overtly religious organisation. So why impose a religious test that prevents scout groups, on some occasions, from getting the leaders that they need? It may be very viable in Thame, but there are scout groups of which I am aware that are struggling because of a lack of leaders. We know that the Criminal Records Bureau test is one cause of their recruiting difficulties.

Lynne Featherstone: Just to even this out a bit, my local scout groups are crying out for volunteers to come and lead them. I do not know whether the inhibition is to do with the religion test, but there is an issue about getting volunteers. This is therefore an important debate, and I am shocked that hon. Members are so dismissive of something that might remove a barrier to peoples taking part.

Evan Harris: In conclusion
Mr. Harperrose
John Masonrose

Evan Harris: I give way to the hon. Member for Forest of Dean.

Mark Harper: Before the hon. Gentleman concludes, there is a shortage of scout leaders, and a number of things have been adduced to that. He mentioned the CRB checks, but there is the issue of the busy lives that people lead now. Employers expect people to be more flexible and available, and do not always allow them to commit the time. I have had lots of those discussions with scout groups in my constituency and with those who are considering making the commitment. I have to say that people have never not got involved because of the concern that the hon. Gentleman raises. It is simply not an example that I, or other hon. Members across the United Kingdom, have come across, apart from the hon. Gentleman in Oxford, West and Abingdon.

Evan Harris: There are very clear rules about using mobile communications in Committee, but I notice that my phone has three text messages. Were I to open them, which I will not, I suspect that they will say, Here is an example, or I will send you an example. The hon. Gentleman represents one 646th of the country. I hope he will accept that if I send him examples, they exist. If I do not send him examples, then he can have a field day next Tuesday.

Joe Benton: Order. I have been very tolerant. By nature, this Bill has to have a wide scope. I see people shaking their heads in disappointment. As I said, the Bill must be granted a wide scope of debate and discussion. On this particular point, however, we have gone as far as we can. I, as Chair of the Committee, will accept the hon. Gentlemans experiences in good faith. We all know what our own individual experiences are, so can we just accept them? Moreover, the shortage of scout leaders is not relevant to this Committee. Let us get back to the amendment, please.

Evan Harris: I was merely taking interventions. I agree 100 per cent. with what you have just said, Mr. Benton. Does the hon. Gentleman still want to intervene?
John Masonindicated dissent.

Evan Harris: Good. I have concluded, therefore, that we would be better off without the exemptionregardless of whether or not the Scouts feel it is importantbecause without it, society will be better for it, young people will be better treated, and the Scouts will be an even more effective and prosperous organisation.

Vera Baird: You have only to say God and God will do. You can be an associate member if you do not say it.

Evan Harris: Again, I am not sure whether that was more expansive or less expansive than the Ministers reply in the previous debate. I think that it was more expansive. I think that she was talking to you, Mr. Benton, so perhaps you are considering joining the Scouts. I think she said that someone only has to say God to join, and if they do not they can be an associate member. There are examples in discrimination law of such situations not being acceptable, for example women being admitted to private members clubs on different terms from men. It should be an either/or.
The analogy with discrimination against women is apposite because the Bill seems to argue that if clubs admit women, they should be admitted on full terms. I think that the Minister was defending, by implication, admitting atheists but not on full terms. I do not know whether she is able or willing to justify differential treatment according to religion, but it amounts to the same thing. Someone is discriminated against on the basis of their religion if they are not allowed to join, or if they are not allowed to lead because they are only an associate member. I shall first send Members those examples, and then seek them out in the corridors of this place before the next stage of the Bill to see whether they are convinced. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 186 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 187

Charities: supplementary

Evan Harris: I beg to move amendment 308, in clause 187, page 134, leave out line 6.

This amendment is to probe the reason for subsection (2), particularly in what way it relates to subsection (4) of Clause 186.
This amendment was tabled with a statement that it was a probing amendment, and an explanation why. I wish, since this is purely a constructive probing exercise, to ask not just whether this situation is the way that it has always been, but why it is that subsection 187(2) says that clause 186
does not apply to race, so far as relating to colour 
when subsection 186(4) says that if
a charitable instrument enables the provision of benefits to persons of a class defined by reference to colour, it has effect for all purposes as if it enabled the provision of such benefits
(a) to persons of the class which results if the reference to colour is ignored, or
(b) if the original class is defined by reference only to colour, to persons generally.
The fundamental problem is that I am unable to determine the meaning of subsection 186(4). I accept that that is my shortcoming, but it might be shared by others. I thought that the best way to raise the issue was by asking what subsection 187(2) does, because it is not obvious what it means, either to me or to others whom I have asked, including legally minded people. I would be grateful, therefore, for an explanation.

Vera Baird: Amendment 308 would remove section 187(2), which prevents charities that provide benefits only to people of particular colour from relying on the exemption in subsections (1) and (2) of clause 186. The effect of the amendment would be that such a charity could seek to show that the restriction of benefits was proportionate in achieving a legitimate aim. There is never any justification for discriminating between people who have different colours, and subsection 186(4) replicates that effect. The law has not changed since 1976, and it is a pity if it has not been understood during all that time. When a charitable instrument defines beneficiaries by reference to colour, the provision takes effect as if the reference to colour were completely disregarded. Therefore, there is no problem here.

Evan Harris: I think that perhaps I understand the provision now. When the Minister is in the mood, she is good at explaining a situation, and I am grateful to her. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 187 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).

Adjourned till this day at One oclock.